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In view of the importance of the PSOE before 1939 and since 1976, and given the wealth of historical literature about the party before and after Franco, it is remarkable that there exists no substantial work on Spanish Socialism during the period of the dictatorship. Curiously, with the exception of Enrique Tierno Galván, no significant figure of the movement within Spain or in the exile has written of his experiences. Without memoirs by Ramón Rubial or Antonio Amat, by Rodolfo Llopis, Indalecio Prieto or Arsenio Jimeno, the silent resistance of the Socialists in the interior and the full extent of the internecine struggles of the exiles are difficult to reconstruct. The historiographical situation of the PSOE stands in sharp contrast to that of the Communist Party. The writings of both PCE propagandists and dissidents has virtually established a Communist monopoly of the history of the anti-Franco opposition. This is a reflection of a reality which cannot be denied -the continuity and pre-eminence of the Communist presence in the struggle against Franco.
However, this cannot be taken as justifying the Communist slur that during the Franco period, the Socialists were de_vacaciones. For a number of reasons, several of them related to Communist tactics both before and during the Civil War, the PSOE was to find itself irretrievably divided in the years following 1939. This goes some way to explaining the lack of concerted Socialist opposition against Franco. The individual heroism of rank-and-file militants has been forgotten in large part because of the lack of a united party ready or able to give it publicity, in the way that the Communist Party, was able to do for its role in the opposition. In this the PCE was amply assisted by the propaganda services of a dictatorship anxious, with an eye on world opinion, to brand all opposition as Communist rather than democratic. At the same time, it has to be remembered that, given their history as a mass parliamentary party and a large legal trade union organization, the PSOE and the UGT were hardly fitted for clandestine struggle. The unity and discipline imposed by rigid hierarchy, democratic centralism and the cell structure together with the existence of help from Moscow gave advantages to the Communist opposition that had no equivalent in the Socialist movement.
The periods of Socialist opposition to the dictatorship can be broadly defined as follows.
The first period, 1939-1950 , was characterized by defeat, greatconfusion and an already discernible tension between the interior and the exiles. In Spain, small groups of militants #. struggled to keep the PSOE alive. Ramón Rubial attempted to reorganize the party in prison;
Socrates Gómez created the first executive in the interior. The party was re-established in Europe by a follower of Largo Caballero from Aragon, Arsenio Jimeno, only after the liberation of Toulouse by the Allies in 1944. The attention of Socialists in exile was absorbed by the world war, by polemics arising from the Civil War and by optimistic speculation about the imminent fall of Franco. For those in the interior, opposition had the more limited but also more realistic aim of survival until assistance from outside might arrive. In general, there was altogether less interest inside Spain in sterile debate over issues like the Junta de Casado. None the less, although Besteiro was dead and Largo Caballero in Mathausen, militants in the interior still looked to the surviving famous leaders of the Republican period. In exile, the energies of these historic leaders were devoted less to the real situation in Spain than to internal polemic and negotiations with representatives of the Western powers in the hope of securing their intervention against General Franco. Within Spain, sporadic guerrilla activities were carried out, especially in Asturias, despite the fact that party policy was not committed to violent opposition.
Indeed, guerrilla action was dominated by the Communists. The expected outside aid was never to come largely because of the attitude of the Allies and the PSOE leadership in exile must bear some responsibility for not perceiving the reality of the international situation earlier than it did.
The period 1951 to 1962 was marked both by a rigid determination of PSOE headquarters at the rue du Taur, Toulouse, to keep control of the interior and, at the same time, by a decline in the real importance of the aging exiledleadership. Small but ultimately important new groups of Socialistsformally unaffiliated to the PSOE began to emerge in Madrid and elsewhere in Spain in opposition to Toulouse. At the same time, even the traditional Socialist strongholds of Asturias and Bilbao began to show signs of discontent with the dictatorial rule of Toulouse. It was a period closed by the symbolic meeting of internal and exiled opposition at the Congress of Munich. In the period 1962 to 1974, the PSOE was to suffer from possessing an exiled leadership whose narrow views and inability to adjust to the dramatic social changes consequent on economic development were to be a serious obstacle to the rebuilding of the party. Accordingly, these twelve years were marked by the increasing isolation of the Toulouse leadership in sharp contrast to the spontaneous emergence all over Spain of new, and often unconnected, groups of Socialists responsive to the changes in Spanish society. A new labour-#. orientated PSOE in Seville and Bilbao, an important group of Socialist intellectuals growing around the journal Cuadernos para el Diálogo, an influential group in Barcelona, the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya, smaller regional groups such as the Partit Socialista Valencià and the Partido Socialista Galego were all symptoms of change. The PSOE itself was to be transformed when links were established between some of these groups and important and responsive sections of the exiled party, thereby creating the basis for the strong renovated party of the post-1974 period.
During all three periods, there have been two major characteristics: the PSOE has consistently taken part in efforts to unite the democratic opposition, but to exclude the were also a defensive response to the efforts of the Communists to by-pass the PSOE, and indeed CNT, leadership and to take over their rank-and-file from above.
Substantial difficulties inevitably arose from the fact that the Socialist Party, like the Communists, the anarchists and the Republicans, with its pre-existing regional and ideological sub-divisions, was divided between the exile and the interior. Under the pressures of absence from Spain, splits occurred which often did not correspond to splits in the interior. Broadly speaking, however, the sector of the PSOE which remained loyal to the pro-Communist They were bitter about the minimal economic aid which reached them from the exile. In
France, the exiles too faced considerable hardship. However, there was considerable resentment inside Spain about the relative comfort allegedly enjoyed by those in Mexico. In fact, the exiled rank-and-file in Mexico and other parts of Latin America could do little, neutralized by distance.
Others nearer Spain often found themselves forced into the French Foreign Legion, German
Labour Brigades or concentration camps. The need to learn new languages and find work in
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hostile environments meant that they had little time to devote to Spain. After all, the PSOE, unlike the PCE, had been quick to link the world war to the Spanish conflict. In consequence, the more active members of the party were as likely to be fighting in the French resistance or the British forces as thinking about Spain. 6 The problems of exile aside, the greatest single factor contributing to the failure of the opposition was the persistence of the ideological divisions of the Civil War, widened by geographical diffusion after 1939 and by embittered recriminations about the reasons for defeat. 7 The most bitter divisions were between the PSOE and the PCE, and between the pro-and antiCommunist factions within the PSOE. The Socialist movement had been divided before the war and, although the theoretical issues had changed somewhat, personal animosities remained to be exacerbated by recriminations over collaboration with the Communists. Socialists both inside and outside Spain were divided on this issue which effectively condemned the party to impotence. Many in the PSOE were appalled by the Communists' behaviour at the beginning of the world war. The PCE denounced the war, which the Socialists saw as their war in defence of democracy, as an imperialist squabble and continued to blame the PSOE for defeat in the war.
Accordingly, the PCE project of national union was rejected with scorn. A minority led by Negrín and Alvarez del Vayo favoured continued collaboration with the Communists while the majority looked to the Allies for deliverance as a result of which they were denounced by the Communists as 'capituladores y traidores'. 8 The bitterness and sterility of Socialist division is best illustrated by the sordid wranglings over the Vita and the use to be made of the funds taken out of Spain. The Negrinistas had organized the Servicio de Emigración de los Republicanos Españoles, while Prieto organized the Junta de Auxilio a los Refugiados Españoles and managed to seize the treasure of the Vita in Mexico. Eventually these funds were used to support
Republican governments in exile. 9 The anti-Communist sections of the PSOE were anxious to reunite the democratic forces.
Projects for unity were to suffer from two major weaknesses: their determined anti-Communism and their faith in the Allies. The internal squabbles had already provoked the fatal error of not setting up a government in exile in London. On 25 November 1943 , the Socialists and the various Republican groups (Izquierda Republicana, Unión Republicana, Esquerra Republicana #.
de Catalunya and Acció Republicana de Catalunya) set up the Junta Española de Liberación in Mexico. In August 1944, after the liberation of France, the same groups plus the CNT joined together in Toulouse and established a JEL in Europe. There then followed a depressing polemic between the JEL and the Unión Nacional in the course of which it was claimed that several PSOE militants were murdered by Communist agents. 10 The Socialist-dominated JEL saw its task as to prepare the way for the entry of the Allied armies into Spain. The Socialists and the Republicans were to take a long time to perceive that their insistence on their democratic credentials could never be as attractive to the West as Franco's unflinching authoritarianism.
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As an indication of the crucial difference in the ambience between the exile and the interior, the problems of the JEL were briefly overcome inside Spain by the creation in October 1944 of the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas. 12 Linking the PSOE, the CNT-MLE and various Republican groups, the ANFD was the most significant initiative towards the unification of the anti-Franco opposition until 1975. It represented a spontaneous effort to overcome the continuous bickering of the exiles and to take advantage of Franco's impending isolation.
Nevertheless, the ANFD needed help from outside and so, in September 1945, when the Republican government in exile under José Giral was constituted, the ANFD recognized it and became its instrument within Spain. When the government failed, the ANFD failed with it.
However, at the time, the link with the government seemed to be the obvious step to take.
Having fought Hitler and Mussolini in Spain, most Socialists and Republicans saw the world war as a natural continuation of their own struggle. For that reason, over 20,000 Spaniards, many of them members of the PSOE and the UGT, died during the Second World War fighting against the Axis. It was widely and understandably assumed within the Socialist movement that when the Axis was defeated, the Allies would finish the task that had been begun in 1936 by turning against Franco. That this did not happen is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, the incompetence pf the exiled leaders did not improve matters. Giral's government was not formed until the Allies were already war-weary and the Cold War was on the horizon. If a responsible Republican government (other than the isolated Negrín government which was not dissolved until 1944) had been formed in 1941 or 1942 when the Allies were desperate for any aid that they could get, it is possible that it might have been recognized and perhaps subsequently installed in Madrid.
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As it was, in 1945, the intention of the Giral government was to get recognition as a prelude to intervention and the re-establishment of the Second Republic. Socialists had been taken in by an elaborate exercise in duplicity, but they virtually had no #. choice since collaboration was the pre-requisite of the Allied aid they so anxiously wanted. 17 Prieto felt obliged to resign as both president of the PSOE and vice-president of the UGT, demoralized and discredited by the negotiations on which he had staked so much. 18 The scale of discontent within the party surfaced at the Congreso Extraordinario held on 31 March and 1
April 1951 at which Trifon Gómez replaced Prieto as PSOE president. Significantly, the main opposition to the executive was voiced by Arsenio Jimeno now leader of the Paris section of the party. 19 In the 1950s, the Socialist movement was divided against itelf by a mixture of misplaced moral intransigence about alliances and petty jealousies within the leadership. Moral intransigence represented the desperate attempt of an atrophying leadership to reassert itself over a dying movement whose membership had reputedly sunk to only 3,000. The increasingly narrow attitude of the PSOE was one of the main reasons for lack of recruitment. Moreover, the PSOE was becoming a party of old men for there were no middle cadres since the Socialist After the death of Centeno, Toulouse had assumed full leadership of the party. However, with the emergence of student opposition in the mid-1950s and the revival of the workers movement especially in Asturias, those in Spain began to argue that they should make policy since only they could accurately calculate the risks and benefits involved. The effective leadership of the interior was taken up by the Basque Antonio Amat Maiz, sometimes known as 'El Ciclista' or 'Guridi'. A man of great courage and determination, he linked up many of the disparate groups in the party and liaised with Toulouse, often making dangerous frontier crossings.
Realizing that the PSOE was in no position to maintain exclusivist positions, the Socialists of the interior pushed for agreement with other groups. In 1956, one of them,
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Professor Enrique Tierno Galván leader of a growing number of Socialists in the universities produced a document on the possible transition to another regime. Amongst other possibilities, the document suggested that if those in the interior did not cooperate with the liberal monarchists for the implantation of a democratic monarchy, then Franco might well establish a reactionary monarchy. The reaction of the Toulouse leadership revealed just how out of touch they were.
The document was denounced as treachery to Repubican legitimacy. As if Tierno was the arbiter of Spain's future, the PSOE leadership convened a meeting with the CNT and the Republicans in Paris in February 1957 to insist that the regime to follow Franco be neither monarchy nor republic until the issue was decided by a plebisicite. 21 At one point, Tierno solicited the support of Gil Robles to sign 'con nosotros un documento dirigido a los socialistas del exterior para que saliesen de su atonía y se uniesen con los socialistas que estabamos luchando dentro, para iniciar una accion en comun, ponderada y no violenta'. Llopis's reply, urging caution and setting out the limits within which alliances could be made had a profound effect on Tierno: 'a mi me hizo reflexionar y fue quiza el momento en que empece a ver claro que poco o nada se podia esperar de fuera'. The pact signed on 24 June 1960 was fundamentally weakened by its exclusion of the Communist Party. Despite its optimistic tone, with a preamble that declared the signatories to be 'conscientes de que una accion comun de los distintos grupos puede precipitar la caida de la dictadura totalitaria que padece España', 25 the irrelevance of such initiatives was underlined by the continuing police attacks on the PSOE in the interior.
In November 1958, Antonio Amat was arrested as part of a great police round-up in Madrid, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Vitoria, Asturias and Andalucia, in which the PSOE lost its files, its propaganda networks and its funds. 26 In Spain as a result of their contacts with emigrant workers and so pushed for change in Toulouse.
As far as Socialist intellectuals inside Spain were concerned, two things happened, both of which are difficult to separate from the influence of Joaquín Ruiz Giménez. Like Ruiz Giménez himself, many Socialists in the interior acted as lawyers for working class leaders on trial. At the same time, they began to write in Ruiz Giménez's journal Cuadernos para el
Diálogo. This was to lay the basis for a future cooperation between the PSOE and the Christian
Democrats which was to be of crucial importance during the period 1975-1977. 29 In the sort of Spain which the economic development was creating, the need for a democratic Socialist movement was of tremendous urgency. The PSOE did not play a great part, institutionally importance, the PSI nevertheless was a reflection of the growth of various currents which together and separately were to contribute to the rebirth of Spanish Socialism. Tierno's idea was 'dotar a las agrupaciones existentes de una determinada coherencia organica que posibilitase un funcionamiento mas eficaz'. Such 'eficacia' could only be in relation to Toulouse. However, the tactical error of choosing to form a separate party, perhaps in the hope of being able to negotiate with Llopis from a position of strength, led to Tierno Galván isolating himself from the #. ultimately successful movement to renovate the party. 32 The fact that the PSI had some support within the Comisiones Obreras was to drive a wedge between it and other groups who focused their efforts on the renovation of the PSOE.
The Toulouse leadership was outraged by Tierno Galván's claim that the PSI was necessary because of 'la inexistencia en el interior del pais de una organización con ideario socialista que canalizase las aspiraciones de la clase trabajadora y de un amplio sector profesional en sus deseos de democracia y defensa de sus intereses'. However, together with the growing importance of the groups from Bilbao and Seville, the evidence of rebellion within when El Socialista published in the interior carried on its front page an article entitled 'Los enfoques de la praxis'. Its conclusion was that 'los socialistas tienen pues una doble tarea que desarrollar: la lucha contra el sistema capitalista que los opone y la lucha contra ciertas estructuras de su propia organizacion que amenazan con la esterilizacion de sus acciones'.
Faced with this open challenge, Llopis was furious at what he denounced as a 'grave injuria colectiva'. The Toulouse executive demanded 'una rectificacion' under threat of declaring the 'incompatibilidad' of the interior executive. So deep was the split between the two executives that a united convocatoria for the next congress due in August 1972 was impossible. The Llopis leadership 'acordaron la no celebración del Congreso en el mes de agosto teniendo en cuenta que en el ambiente de crisis, de ruptura y de escision existente celebrar el Congreso equivale a querer que haya ruptura y escision... Si a pesar de lo que acabamos de escribir, se celebrase el Congreso, convocado por una parte del Partido, nos veriamos en el caso de declarar faccioso dicho congreso. Y advertimos a quienes asistan que, por el hecho de asistir a ese congreso, se colocan fuera de la disciplina del Partido y procederemos en consecuencia'. Despite these threats, the #. interior executive went ahead with the convocatoria of the Congress. 33 At that point, older Felipe González became primer secretario; Nicolás Redondo, secretario de organización;
Enrique Múgica, secretario de coordinación; Pablo Castellano, secretario internacional; José #. Maria Benegas, secretario de juventudes. With Francoism crumbling, there was a need for the flexible democratic Socialist party now being created. The fact that the renovated PSOE was more in tune with Spanish society was reflected in the spectacular growth that the party was to experience after 1976 and in its electoral success in 1977, 1979 and ultimately 1982 . After the parenthesis of Francoism, the PSOE was able to resume its rightful place in Spanish politics.
